Abstract-Previous research works have endorsed the use of delays and clock skews for detecting intrusions or fingerprinting ECUs on the CAN bus. Similar techniques have been also proposed for establishing a time-covert cryptographic authentication channel, in this way cleverly removing the need for cryptographic material inside the limited payload of CAN frames. The main shortcoming of such works is the limited security level that can be achieved under normal CAN-bus traffic. In this work we endeavour to test the limits of the achievable security level by relying on optimization algorithms for scheduling CAN frames. Under practical bus allocations that are based on real-world scenarios, we are able to extract around 4-5 bits of authentication data from each frame which leads to an efficient intrusion detection and authentication mechanism. By accumulating covert channel data over several consecutive frames, we can achieve higher security levels that are in line with current security demands. To prove the correctness of our approach, we present experiments on state-of-the-art automotive-grade controllers (Infineon Aurix) and bus measurements with the use of industry standard tools, i.e., CANoe.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Following small demonstrations for potential attacks on invehicle buses, e.g., [18] , the feasibility of attacking real-world vehicles has been proved by recent works such as [22] , [8] , [28] , etc. All the security problems of in-vehicle networks stem from the fact that the Controller Area Network (CAN) is a decades-old bus which has no intrinsic security.
CAN is the most widely employed protocol for in-vehicle communications. It can transmit up to 8 bytes of data in a single frame (frame structure is depicted in Figure 1 ) at a maximum bit rate of 1Mbit/s. Being built with reliability in mind, CAN uses several mechanisms to assure this property. Arbitration is performed as an ID-based bus access priority to avoid collisions, while a 15 bit CRC aids in the identification of bit errors. For avoiding synchronization loss, CAN uses bit stuffing to ensure sufficient transitions in long sequences of bits of the same value. After each five consecutive identical bits, CAN introduces an additional bit of opposite value.
Following the recently reported attacks, the research community quickly answered with dozens of proposals for securing the CAN bus. As expected, most of these rely on the use of cryptographic Message Authentication Codes (MACs) (e.g., [17] , [33] , [23] , [34] , or more recently [3] and many others). But due to the limited size of the CAN frame, i.e., 64 bits, two options have been commonly discussed in the Bogdan Groza, Lucian Popa and Pal-Stefan Murvay are with the Faculty of Automatics and Computers, Politehnica University of Timisoara, Romania, Email: bogdan.groza@aut.upt.ro, lucian.popa.lp@gmail.com, palstefan.murvay@aut.upt.ro literature: truncating the MAC code or sending the MAC as a distinct packet. The last option creates additional problems since sending a new authentication frame for each regular frame doubles the bus-load and does not cope with practical demands. Nonetheless, it introduces authentication delays. The first procedure, MAC truncation, is supported by the more recent security specifications introduced in the AUTOSAR [2] architecture which require 24 bit security for a CAN frame. However, reserving 24 bits out of the 64 bit CAN frame payload for security may not be convenient as this is represents 37% of the payload. Additionally, the standard specifies 8 bits for a freshness parameter, leading to 32 bits reserved for security purposes and thus 50% of the frame becomes unusable for regular data. In general, it seems that including cryptographic material in CAN frames remains somewhat problematic as the small packet size of CAN is hardly able to cope with the required level of security. A third option is to hide the authentication bits by using alternative physical layers such as CAN+ [39] which is an extension of CAN. Such an approach was proposed in [32] . However, CAN+ transceivers do not exist inside vehicles and due to the migration to CAN-FD it seems unlikely for CAN+ to be adopted by the automotive industry.
In a recent work, we exploited the fine-grained control of timer-counter circuits in a constructive manner by designing a time-covert cryptographic authentication channel [15] . This proposal has the merit of allowing authentication to be carried out outside the limited 64 bit payload of the CAN frame. However, the problem with the work in [15] is that performance degrades significantly when the covert channel is placed over existing (unoptimized) CAN-bus traffic. A similar approach for creating a covert authentication channel based on frame arrival time can be found in [38] , but the achieved security level is very limited at 1 covert bit for each CAN frame. Moreover, the authentication in [38] is dedicated to the transmitter, not to the content of the frame itself. On the other hand, covert timing channels have been well explored in computer networks, e.g., [4] , [27] , [7] , but we are unaware of the use of such channels for securing in-vehicle communication (except for the aforementioned recent papers [15] and [38] that, in contrast to such works, our intention is not in keeping the channel secret, but rather not interfering with the data-field and keeping the bus free. While there is not much related work on covert channels for CAN, there are several related works that are in close relation to our approach. Optimal traffic allocation with respect to the security payload has been targeted by a small amount of works dedicated to CAN security such as [25] , [26] , [24] and [37] . These works do not target the creation of a covert timing authentication channel, but they focus on optimization problems for CAN traffic. Nonetheless, many recent research works have been focusing on using frame arrival time, i.e., the delays that we use to create a covert channel, in order to detect intrusions, e.g., [29] and [31] . By using Bloom filters [6] , frame arrival time has been also combined with frame content to filter malicious activity in [14] . More recently, frame periodicity has been exploited to extract clock skews which is used to create a unique fingerprint for each ECU due to physical imperfections in oscillators in [10] . This sets room for physical fingerprinting of CAN nodes. The use of clock skews has been explored for fingerprinting computers for more than a decade by the work in [21] and not surprisingly it was also applied to smart-phones [13] . Unfortunately, identification mechanisms based on clock-skews are rendered ineffective by the fine grained control of time-triggered interrupts on embedded devices which allows ECUs to potentially fake their clock-skews as demonstrated by [30] . All these works are exploiting the precision of the clock circuitry in the controller, which also stays at the core of our proposal here.
To save bits from the data-field, other works have suggested the use of the identifier field, i.e., [16] , [19] , [36] and [35] , but this requires special care as the identifier field is critical for arbitration and also used for filtering purposes. An alternative to identify senders without compromising bits of the CAN frame is to use physical signal characteristics, e.g., [11] , [12] , [20] , but these approaches may be vulnerable to small variations in bus impedance.
Contribution in brief. In this work we create a covert authentication channel, which leaves the bits in the CAN frame unchanged, and increase its data rate by relying on efficient frame scheduling. We do assume a bus-load of ≈ 40% which complies with recommendations for real-world implementations. We discuss several frame allocation mechanisms and find limits for the authentication payload that can be carried in a covert manner. The addressed scenario is briefly outlined in Figure 2 . To avoid overloading the figure, only two ECUs and one external device (potentially a CANcase) are depicted, but there are no restrictions regarding the number of ECUs or external devices in our scenario. The main advantages and disadvantages of a covert authentication channel on the CAN bus are the following:
• it does not consume bits from the data-field which is quite limited at 64 bits, • it covertly embeds authentication data in the frame that carries the data, without requiring an additional authentication frame, • it does not increase the bus-load since authentication data is hidden in delays. The main concept behind how frame authentication works in our proposal, i.e., encoding authentication data in delays and adding optimizations for frame timings, is detailed in Figure 3 . CAN frames, depicted by the identifier field ID, arrive on the bus in a cyclic manner (to avoid overloading the figure, we omit the data-field, but this is used in the message authentication code along with the ID). While onevent frames may also exist on the CAN bus, the majority of the CAN traffic is cyclic in nature and we focus our work on authenticating such traffic. We depict identifiers for 3 distinct delays ∆ = 10, 20, 50ms. A drift ξ is added to each delay which carries authentication data in a covert manner. In principle ξ is the last byte of a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC). This MAC is computed over the content of the entire frame and will be distinct for every frame assuming proper use of freshness parameters, e.g., timestamps or counters. To avoid overloading the figure we omit such details in the graphical outline. Fig. 3 . Overview of the mechanism: frame arrival on the bus at delays ∆ = 10, 20, 50ms with adjustment i , i = 1..3 and covert authentication delay ξ resulting from a cryptographic MAC in gray). Such schedule overlapping is not a problem from a transmission point of view, however, it impedes correct measurements of the arrival delays and thus the creation of a covert authentication channel. To avoid such situations, we use an additional delay i , i = 1..3 in order to allocate traffic in an optimal manner and keep frame inter-distance at a maximum. Figure 4 tries to clarify why unpredictable delays are problematic for a time-covert channel. The left side of the figure shows the inter-transmission times between frames as recorded in a real-world vehicle. While the entire traffic is cyclic, the inter-transmission time is noisy and deviations from the expected arrival time do greatly interfere with the creation of a time-covert channel. To improve performance we do rely on optimization algorithms. The right side of Figure 4 shows inter-transmission times after the traffic is optimized. The same bus-load and the same number of IDs is used, but the intertransmission time now follows a clearer pattern. Creating a covert timing channel is possible without bus optimizations, but it is obvious that the optimized version will have a superior bitrate due to less noise on the covert channel.
II. BACKGROUND AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
This section gives a brief overview on delays and clock skews on the CAN network. Nonetheless we discuss limitations in previous works on covert timing channels for the CAN bus. Then we describe the components of our setup.
A. Clock skews and limitations in previous work
In Figure 5 we show how clock skews accumulate when three ECUs are broadcasting at fix time intervals δ. While the delay δ is fixed, due to clock imprecision, the time measured at each ECU is in fact δ 1 , δ 2 and δ 3 respectively. If the first ECU measures the arrival time for frames received from the second and third ECUs, the delays accumulate. The result is a slope which represents the skew of the clock. In Figure 6 we show the clock skew from an experimental measurement over a longer period of 4 hours (since each frame is sent at 100ms around 145.000 frames are depicted). The slope of the line remains stable despite that the counter resets at roughly 45.000 frames resulting in a small drift. Figure 7 shows a graphical depiction for the delays measured on one Infineon board vs. CANoe in case of frames broadcast periodically by another Infineon board. The depiction is according to our previous work in [15] . Delays are forced at ±100, ±250, ±500 clock ticks (1 tick is 10ns) and thus several slopes are visible in the picture.
The main limitation of our previous work on creating covert channels on the CAN bus was that existing traffic (poorly allocated) impedes the data-rate of the covert channel. Figure  8 shows the variation of delays recorded on four Infineon TriCore boards without (left) and with (right) existing network traffic according to [15] (delays are expressed as a fraction between the expected arrival time and recorded arrival time). In case of existing traffic, some of the frames arrive with significant delays making them indistinguishable for frames that are sent with random delays. These delays contribute to the false-positives of an intrusion detection mechanism. As we discuss and show in this work, traffic optimization is the only solution to this problem.
B. Setup components
We implement and evaluate optimizations on traffic allocation using an AURIX TC224 TFT Application Kit. The development board features a TC224 32-bit TriCore CPU that runs at frequencies up to 133 MHz and provides 1MB of FLASH memory and 96kB of RAM memory. The CAN frames transmitted by our TriCore-based implementation are recorded using CANoe, a software tool used for analyzing and testing of automotive networks. To achieve this, the CANoe running PC is interfaced with the development board through an VN CAN to PC adapter as depicted in Figure 9 . The recorded traces were analyzed offline using Mathematica.
Since, according to the described mechanism, CAN frames have to be transmitted in specific time slots, nodes need to implement a time keeping functionality. We implemented this on the TC224 using the Capture/Compare Unit 6 Timer (CCU6) module which was configured to trigger an interrupt every 1 µs as a base tick for our local clock. Additionally, we used the last 8 bits of a pre-computed MAC value as a delay, multiple of 1 µs based on the CCU6 Timer's ticks, between the message cycle time + ε and the time when the message was actually sent on the bus, in the time-covert channel.
All of the message data bytes, configured message cycle times and the selected ε values for each message were configured in the MultiCAN+ module. The MultiCAN+ module is also responsible for transmitting the frame data to the CAN transceiver with the specified baudrate of 500 kbps.
After performing the initial hardware setup, the initial MAC values are calculated for each message. During runtime, based on the counter value incremented in CCU6's timer, the cycle times for all frames and the ε values, each frame is sent, but with a small delay as already described. The frame delivery will take place after ξ ticks of the CCU6 Timer have expired. After each frame delivery, the message counter is incremented and a new MAC value is calculated based on the message data and the message counter.
III. OPTIMIZING TRAFFIC ALLOCATION
This section addresses the optimization algorithms that we use. Traffic allocation is essential for achieving a satisfactory data-rate on the covert channel. We design and discuss four algorithms for traffic allocation and prove their effectiveness by both theoretical models/simulation and experimental data. We use two of these algorithms in the next section and implement the covert channel over optimized CAN-bus traffic. 
A. Problem statement
We consider a set of n pairs {(id 1 , ∆ 1 ), (id 2 , ∆ 2 ), ..., (id n , ∆ n )}, each pair being formed by a CAN identifier and the delays (periodicity) corresponding to the identifier. If on-event frames exist, a distinct mechanism should be used, this situation however is out of scope for our
} be the set of identifier-timestamp pairs where timestamp T i j , ∀j = 1..l is the time at which id i was received on the bus. Ideally,
.n, j = 1..l, which means that frames having the same identifier ID are received at periodicity ∆ i . In practice however, there are many reasons that impede a perfect arrival time. Besides clock drifts, i.e., the clock of sender and receiver nodes is not identical, delays may occur due to frames with overlapped sending time. Since CAN arbitration is non-destructive, there is no problem if two nodes try to send a frame at the same time. But the frame with the higher ID loses arbitration and will be sent after the smaller ID which makes the arrival time drift from the expected ∆ i .
Frame arrival time. The time required for a frame to be transmitted on the bus depends on the size of the frame and data rate of the bus. Datarate can be up to 1Mbps in standard CAN, though lower datarates of 125-500kbps are commonly employed. The size of the frame varies due to the number of stuffing bits, i.e., one bit of reverse polarity is added after 5 consecutive identical bits (for a frame with 64 bits of data plus the header, a maximum of 19 stuffing bits can be added). The left side of Figure 10 shows the variation of frame arrival time in case of a 64 bits data frame which expands to 111 bits (without stuffing bits) and which may take as little as 100µs on 1Mbps or up to 900µs on a low-speed 125kbps bus (stuff bits not included). For a broader image, the right side of Figure 10 expands this calculation for variable size frames (0-64 bits) size and bus rates (64kbps-1Mbps).
Frame arrival time in real-world traces. In Figure 11 we depict the arrival time for frames scheduled at 10, 40, 150 and 500ms. The left side of the figure shows the delay between frames carrying the same ID and the right side the histogram distribution of the same delay. Even for the higher priority frame arriving at 10ms, deviations of 400µs are common. For the 40ms frame deviations of 2 − 4ms are common and the situation is similar for the 150ms frame. In case of the 500ms frame, deviations of 10ms become common as well.
Such deviations from the expected arrival time exist and they clearly lower the bitrate of a covert timing channel. The deviations from the expected arrival time are directly influenced by local clocks and the priority of the message ID, but these can be circumvented by clever allocation of frame timings as we discuss next.
B. Optimizing frame scheduling
In the previously defined framework, if each frame is sent at multiples of ∆ i , i = 1..n, the collisions on the bus between frame i, j, ∀i, j = 1..n will occur at multiples of lcm(∆ i , ∆ j ) (here lcm stands for the least common multiple of the two integers). This can be extended to any number of frames. In theory, all frames will collide on the bus at lcm(∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ..., ∆ n ). Again, such collisions are non-destructive but they impede the time-covert channel. To avoid such collisions, we extend the frame scheduling set to {(id 1 , ∆ 1 , 1 ), (id 2 , ∆ 2 , 2 ), ..., (id n , ∆ n , n )} where i , i = 1..n is a small drift added to the frame sending time. By our allocation, frames will be sent at intervals k∆ i + i (rather than k∆ i ). Our optimization problem consists in finding the values for i , i = 1..n such that for a given set of delays ∆ i , i = 1..n no collisions will occur on the bus and moreover, the space between frames is maximized.
We use the following theoretical model to compute optimal frame allocation. Let the following n sets of traces corresponding to the n IDs broadcast over the CAN network:
Having the previous equations, we say that the frame scheduling is complete if
.n denotes the cardinality of the set T i . By this condition on the equality of the sets, we request that timings are distinct for all of the n frames.
Let T * = {t 1 , t 2 , ..., t n } be the set containing all time stamps for all messages, we assume this set to be sorted in ascending order, i.e., the natural way in which frames are expected to arrive on the bus. We say that the frame scheduling is optimal if the following value is minimal:
The quality factor q in the previous equation is defined in order to assure a maximum inter-frame space (IFS). That is, the larger the IFS, the smaller the values 1/(t i − t i−1 ) and thus their sum will be smaller. In what follows we discuss four variants of allocation algorithms that target the optimization of the quality factor q.
A practical allocation example. The subsequent optimization examples address the following frame periodicity vector which is based on existing CAN traffic from a real-world vehicle: Binary symmetric allocation. This is the simplest of the allocation algorithms that we use, it is very easy to implement and gives good results (we improve however on the inter-frame space with the next algorithms). In the binary symmetric allocation, we start with a bin size equal to the window size w which is the minimum of the delays w = min (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ..., ∆ n ) and allocate all the values i , i = 1..n to fit symmetrically in the interval [0..w]. For this we start with a bin of size w then we create new values i -s by dividing each existing bin. That is, 1 is first placed at w/2, then for 2 and 3 two new bins are created at w/4 and 3w/4, etc. The algorithm is presented in Figure 12 . We assume the delays appear in rdelays in ascending order (∆ 1 is missing from the list since it is already allocated to a default value 1 = 0). Variable blist is instantiated with the first delay ∆ 1 (for which we allocate a default value 0 = 0) and a second delay ∞ which is merely a placeholder for delimiting the bin which has size ∆ 1 . In step 4 we loop until an i is generated for each value ∆ i . For this purpose, we create a new list blist in step 5 and loop in step 6 over all existing values in blist to create a new value 
while size(rdelays) > 0 do for i = 2, i ≤ size(blist) do 7: if size(rdelays) > 0 then 8:
blist ← append (blist , blist[i])
10:
rdelays ← delete(rdelays, 1) is replaced with blist at each iteration. At the end of the procedure blist will contain all pairs { ( 1 , ∆ 1 ) , ..., ( n , ∆ n )}. A graphical depiction of the theoretical frame timings is in Figure 13 . In Figure 14 we present the experimental results as measured from CANoe in when an Infineon node broadcasts frames with the corresponding timings. The theoretical results and experimental measurements are reasonably close. Differences exists as several frames are broadcast later resulting in a 2.5ms inter-frame delay. The reason for this is that the minimum inter-frame space is at 250µs which is also around the time needed to place a frame on the bus at 500 kbps. Due to computational delays on the controller, if the time-slot is missed, the frame will be sent at some later point missing the expected allocation on the bus. We conclude that 250µs for inter-frame space is somewhat too short.
Randomized search allocation. The randomized search first creates a list of i , i = 1..n that are equally spaced. A distance set to e where e = min (∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ..., ∆ n )/n is a natural choice since at worst all frames will appear during the periodicity of the fastest frame from the bus. However, other values may be fixed for e. Then the i , i = 1..n values are allocated randomly to each delay ∆ i , i = 1..n. After iterations (each consisting in a randomized allocation) the best allocation is kept. The result improves with a higher number of iterations. The algorithm is presented in Figure 15 . First, the value of e is computed in line 2, then values of the target epsilons are generated in line 3 and stored in reps. The current optimum q is set to ∞ in line 6 and the best allocation reps is set to void in line 7. Then we loop in line 8 for max iterations . During each loop, the new values reps are set to a random permutation from reps in line 9. Lines 10-16 compute the quality factor q for the new allocation. For this, the set of timestamps T j , j = 1..n is generated for each delay, according to the corresponding j of the current permutation. The timestamps are computed for a timeframe T (in our practical tests we set this to 1-10 seconds). Then the set of timestamps T * is sorted and q is computed accordingly. If the result is better than for the previous optimum, i.e., line 17, the new result is stored in reps , otherwise it is dropped. The randomized search gave somewhat better results than the binary symmetric allocation, but again the 250µs seems to be problematic for some frames (we improve on this with the next two algorithms). Figure  16 holds the theoretical expectations and Figure 17 holds the experimental measurements, these are again reasonably close to each other.
Greedy allocation. In the Greedy allocation, for n delays, we first create bins that are equally spaced at distance e = min(∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ..., ∆ n )/n (this is identical to the case of the previous algorithm). Then we allocate the delays in ascending order in such way that q is minimized. The algorithm is summarized in Figure 18 . The algorithm starts by building the set of values i , i = 1..n in a similar way to the randomized allocation described previously. Then it loops for each delay in line 7 and for each of the remaining values loops again in line 10 in order to find the optimum value for the current delay. Each of the selected values is tested against the optimization criteria in a similar manner to the randomized allocation. The index of the optimal value is stored in ind and this is removed from the values stored in reps in line 21 such that only the remaining values could be allocated for the next delay ∆ i . Figure 19 and 20 hold the theoretical expectations and experimental measurements. The results are closer than for the previous two algorithms which suggests Greedy to be a better optimization.
Greedy Multi-Layer. To finally circumvent the 250µs interframe space issues we modify the Greedy allocation to a MultiLayer Greedy allocation in which frames at delay ∆ i , i = 1..n are allowed to be placed at any multiple of e that is smaller than ∆ i . This allows for a better expansion of the frames since frames at a larger ∆ i can benefit from a larger i . We skip formalism for this algorithm to avoid overloading the paper. The theoretical and experimental results are in Figures 21 and  22 . This time the results are almost identical and the interframe space is expanded to up to 500µs.
GCD based allocation. We also try a Greatest Common Divisor (GCD) based allocation in which the frames are spaced by a delay, e.g., fixed at 500µs + δ i where δ i , i = 1..n, for j = 1, i ≤ n, j = j + 1 do
12:
Tj ← {k∆j + reps [j]; k = 1.. T /∆j }
13:
T * ← append (T * , Tj)
14:
end for 15:
if q < q then which is a multiple of gcd(∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ..., ∆ n ) subject to the condition that 500µs + δ i is smaller than ∆ i . The algorithm is depicted in Figure 23 . It starts from building a matrix M of max(delays)/G rows and min(delays)/ columns, where G is the greatest common divisor of the delays and is the minimum allowable IFS. The matrix is initially filled by 1s. Then in step 7 the algorithm loops for all the delays searching for each of them an empty row in the matrix M . The search is done in the loop from step 11 starting from row j = 1 (initialized in step 9) and continuously increases j in step 35 until a row without 0s is found. To test that the current row has non-zero values, the loop in step 14 goes until the end of the current line aux. If the resulting k is smaller than the length of the line |aux|, then starting from step 17, the line is filled with zeros at l = d/G steps (where d is the e ← min(∆1, ∆2, ..., ∆n)/n 3: reps ← {0, e, 2e, ..., (n − 1)e} 4: reps ← {} 5: delays ← {∆1, ∆2, ..., ∆n)}
6:
T * ← {} 7:
ind = 1
10:
for j = 1, j ≤ size(reps), j = j + 1 do
11:
T * aux ← T *
12:
Tj ← {k∆j + reps [j]; k = 1.. T /∆j } 13:
if opt < opt then reps ← remove(reps, ind )
22:
reps ← append (reps , ind )
23:
T * ← append (T * , Ti)
25:
end for 26: end procedure Fig. 18 . Algorithm for Greedy allocation current delay). The result for the current delay is placed in reps in line 31. The allocation provides results similar to the case of the Multi-Layer Greedy allocation, the runtime of the algorithm is however much faster. A potential drawback is that the algorithm doesn't search for minimizing q, it rather places frames at a minimum IFS fixed to . The theoretical and experimental results are in Figures 24 and 25 and we attempt to increase the inter-frame space to 600µs which we succeed.
In Table I we summarize a comparison between the four optimization algorithms. The main drawback with the first three algorithms is that they leave a minimum inter-frame space of only 150µs -250µs which is problematic since it may be smaller than the transmission window for a single frame (this may cause delays that pile-up and compromise the data-rate of the covert channel). The multi-layer Greedy and circular GCD show better performance and the minimum IFS is kept at 500µs which sufficient for the transmission of single frames. 
IV. PROTOCOL AND RESULTS
In this section we give an outline of the protocol, then we discuss practical results on the covert timing channel that carries authentication tags.
A. Main protocol
In the current work we are focused on bus optimization for achieving a maximum capacity for the covert channel. The protocol for sending and receiving frames is not distinct from our previous proposal [15] named INCANTA since we use the same kind of covert channel based on the drift of the frame from the expected arrival time. A minor difference is that to each delay ∆ i , i = 1..n we add the corresponding value i , i = 1..n resulting from the optimization algorithm. For consistency, we keep the same name and description for our protocol INCANTA (INtrusion detection in Controller Area Networks with Time-covert cryptographic Authentication). IN-CANTA consists in the following set of actions that are to be followed by each node: 1) SendCyclic(id i , m) is the procedure triggered at some fixed delays k∆ i + i for a frame with identifier field Algorithm 4 GCD-based allocation
G ← gcd(delays) 4:
← 0.5 5:
reps ←⊥ 6:
while s = false&j ≤ |M | do 12:
while k ≤ |aux |&aux [k] = 0 do 15:
end while 17:
while a ≤ |aux | id i at which the responsible sender ECU computes the tag tag = MAC k (k, id i , m) where k is a counter that is incremented for each new message to be send. The sender then sets T = tag and performs a wait operation wait(T) then broadcasts message (id, m), 2) RecCyclic(id i , m) at which the k th instance of a message with identifier id i is received. Let time t k be the time at which the message is received, the receiver computes tag = MAC k (k, id, m) and T k = tag then checks if |t k − t k−1 | − (delta + T k − T k−1 )| ≤ ρ and if this fails it drops the frame and reports an intrusion otherwise it considers the frame as genuine.
We consider that a shared secret key k exists on each ECU from the CAN bus. We do not discuss how this key is shared since this is addressed by several other works. Moreover, we consider that the frame-scheduling set { (id 1 , ∆ 1 , 1 ), (id 2 , ∆ 2 , 2 ) , ..., (id n , ∆ n , n )} is available to all genuine ECUs on the network. The delay is computed as the difference between two consecutive timestamps for the same ID in order to remove potential clock-skews. Indeed, by experimental measurements we did determine that clock skews may impede correct identification of delays. Concrete values for practical instances of the scheme and results are discussed next.
B. Adversary model
We consider the regular type of Dolev-Yao adversary that has full control over the communication channel. We note however that removing a genuine node from the bus is not easy in automotive-based scenarios since this requires either physical intervention or placing the node in the bus-off state. The later possibility has been recently demonstrated in [9] by exploiting the CAN error management system but it requires active error flags (which are visible on the bus) and the genuine node will remain in the bus-off state only for a fixed period of time. Moreover, removing a node will likely result in losing many functionalities from the car and many IDs from the bus, a behaviour which will likely be immediately recognized by the remaining ECUs. If the adversary cannot remove the genuine node from the bus it is very likely that the only effect of the adversary's intervention will be a DoS since injected frames will likely cause delays even for genuine frames. Addressing such a situation may be future work for us, but due to the design of the CAN bus a DoS will be always feasible, e.g., the adversary could simply corrupt any frame by overwriting one recessive bit with a dominant bit (this in turn may lead to a CRC error and all nodes will respond with active error flags, etc.).
Assuming that the adversary can by some mean target a genuine node or a specific ID and remove it from the bus, the adversary further has to guess the exact delay at which the genuine frame needs to be sent. The success rate of an adversary can be estimated synthetically as:
Here ρ is the delay tolerance for accepting a frame and is the security level (this are part of the protocol description that follows). This models the expected scenario where an adversary can at best insert a frame at some random point that hopefully will match the expected delay. 
C. Results
In Figure 26 we give an overview on the inter-frame delays on the bus with (ii) and without (i) the covert channel in place. Note that when the covert channel is in place, the delays vary with ±128µs. This becomes more evident in the details from the right side of the picture for the case of frames separated by only 500µs.
The experiments that we carried proved to be consistent for all the IDs, regardless of the delays at which they are sent, i.e., 10, 20, 50 or 100ms. The variation of the estimated delay was in the order of ±10µs which is consistent with the time of 5 CAN bits (at 500kbps the duration of one bit on the CAN bus ≈ 2µs). This variation may be due to the variation in frame length due to the number of stuffing bits which differs (we improve on this next). Figure 27 shows the delays and their histogram distribution for frames broadcast at at 10ms (i), 20ms (ii), 50ms (iii) and 100ms (iv). Note that there are fewer samples as the delay increases. The deviation from the expected arrival time remains in the aforementioned range of ±10µs for all frames and IDs. This is a good result considering the busload which is identical to real-world operation of the CAN bus.
To go even further, we have also taken the frame length into account and achieve a better match as depicted in Figure 28 . The minimum error for all messages was at −4.62µs and the maximum at 4.87µs which means that at a 5µs tolerance all genuine messages will get the intended delay.
In Table II we give the average rate for the true negatives given the 2, 3 or 4µs tolerance bound. We depict both the success rate for the genuine frames, i.e., ecu , and the adversary advantage adv . In case of ecu , the values are computed as the mean value taken over all the 40 IDs in a trace covering around 1.2 million frames. Concretely, the 2µs error covered between 91.4% − 95.2% depending on the ID, while the 3µs and 4µs covered 99.21% − 99.93% and 99.96% − 100% respectively. The adversary advantage adv is synthetically computed as discussed previously. We also extend these results for the case of multiple frames, i.e., over k frames, the adversary advantage becomes tolerance is used, all genuine frames are to be accepted, while the chance of an adversary to inject a frame is less than 1 in a million. Six frames are to be received in 1.5 − 6ms as we discuss later, thus the authentication delay is not high. In Figure 29 we depict an estimation for the adversary success rate compared to an 15-bit security level (left) and 24-bit security level (right). The 15-bit security level was chosen for comparison since it is the size of the CRC for CAN frames (the CRC is not resilient in front of adversaries but it worths as comparison), while the 24-bit security level is demanded by AUTOSAR [2] . The required security level of AUTOSAR can be reached in 5-6 frames.
Data-rate of the covert channel. The data-rate of noisy , [5] . To use these algorithms we have first extracted the channel matrix which gathers the probability that delay ∆ ∈ [1, 256] µs is encoded into delay ∆ ∈ [1, 256] µs. Once the channel was computed we used a freely available Matlab implementation of the algorithm 1 and determined that channel 1 https://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/32757-channelcapacity-using-arimoto-blahut-algorithm capacity is ≈ 4.9 bits. Again, this suggests that the 24-bit security level can be achieved in six CAN frames. This datarate can be also estimated from the results in Table II since by setting a tolerance to 10µs we get a noiseless channel. But now the 256 symbols are reduced to 25 and thus a data-rate of ≈ 4.6 bits (this is a bit lower of the channel capacity computed with Arimoto-Blahut algorithms which gives an upper-bound).
Multi-frame authentication. Cumulating delays over multiple frames is an option for increasing the security level. In 3 consecutive frames the security level is around 12 bits while for 6 consecutive frames it reaches the desired 24 bits for invehicle security. The authentication delay tops at 1.3ms for 3 frames and 6ms for 6 consecutive frames as depicted in Figure 30 . This is just a worst case scenario since often the space between frames is 500µs and thus around 1.5ms or 3ms are to be expected. This is a very small delay for the 24 bit authentication level considering that no cryptographic operation is needed except for the regular MAC and the busload is not increased.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We provide optimizations for scheduling CAN frames in order to reach an increased level of security on a time-covert cryptographic channel. The four optimization algorithms that we study show clear advantages for creating a covert timing channel on CAN. The Greedy Search and Circular GCD give better results, with a minimum inter-frame distance of 500 µs which can further accommodate time-covert authentication. Over the optimized bus, the delays drift only in the ±10µs range which roughly corresponds to the the time of 5 CAN bits (the number of bits in each frame may drift due to stuffing bits). With these small deviations, around 4 bits can be covertly carried by each frame which means that the 24-bit security level demanded by recent standards may be reached in about 6 frames. Given the data rate and the fact that frames are spaced by around 250 − 500µs this means that 24 security bits may be cumulated in around 3ms. Maintaining such strict delays is not necessarily easy, but we believe that modern microcontrollers can cope with them. Based on our analysis, the drifts from the expected arrival time are mostly caused by unoptimized traffic rather than by the accuracy of the controller's clock. Our procedures help in this direction by optimizing traffic allocation. Further investigations are needed to test the feasibility of the proposed procedures inside a realworld vehicle. Since modern time-triggered protocols, such as FlexRay, demand synchronization in the order of 10µs in the worst case, we believe that covert channels may be implemented at the rigorous timing demands from our work. At the very least, we report an experimental upper bound, i.e., 4-5 bits, for such covert channels under optimized traffic flows.
